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Bankruptcy Voting and the
Designation Power
by
Christopher W. Frost*
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code is the only form of bankruptcy that
requires winning the consent of the creditor body.' Creditors are given the
right to vote based on an underlying assumption that they will cast their
votes to maximize recovery on their claims. When creditors collectively vote
to further these distributional goals, then the estate in turn should realize the
maximum value for its assets. "Value maximization" is one of the fundamen-
tal goals of chapter 11, and voting in bankruptcy is an important way of
achieving that goal.
The problem with these assumptions is that creditors sometimes vote for
reasons other than their distributional goals. For example, if a creditor owns
a competing business, it may be less concerned with maximizing recovery on
its claim and more concerned with putting the debtor out of business no
matter what terms the debtor offers. When creditors cast their votes for
reasons other than their distributional goals, then the collective vote may no
longer reflect the value-maximization goal of chapter 11.
The Bankruptcy Code provides the courts with a mechanism to guard
against the exercise of "voting" power based on these non-distributional moti-
vations. Section 1126(e) allows a court to "designate" or disqualify a vote
that was not cast "in good faith, or was not solicited or procured in good faith
or in accordance with the provisions of this title."2 The Code does not define
the phrase "in good faith," leaving courts to fill this breach on a case-by-case
basis.' Broadly speaking, courts have held that a vote should be disqualified
when it is cast for a reason other than the creditor's desire to maximize its
recovery on its claim.
*Frost, Brown, Todd Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. B.B.A. 1983, J.D.
1986, University of Kentucky.
'See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (2006),
211 U.S.C. § 1126(e). The power to disqualify votes also extends to shareholders votes, but all of the
cases examining the designation power have arisen in the context of creditor votes. Accordingly, this
article focuses on the designation of claims and not interests. However, most, if not all, of the observations
made here would apply equally to questions regarding the disqualification of shareholder votes.
'See In re Save Our Springs (S.O.S.) Alliance, Inc., 388 B.R. 202, 230 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2008)
("[C]ourts have developed the meaning of good (and bad) faith on the basis of the facts of each particular
case."), affd, 2009 WL 8637183 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2009), affd, 632 F.3d 168 (5th Cir. 2011).
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In many areas, the courts have faithfully fulfilled this duty to screen
outside influences that creep into the voting process. In the last two decades,
however, the proliferation of claims trading in bankruptcy cases has increased
the prevalence of voting based on outside influences, and the effectiveness of
creditors who seek to influence the bankruptcy process for non-distributional
ends. There is nothing new in a creditor buying other claims to influence the
vote on a plan, but the amount of claims trading and the motivations behind
it have dramatically changed over time. Some of these motivations are not
known to the debtor, let alone the court, making it more difficult to regulate
the voting process. This is especially true in cases of credit swaps, total
return swaps, and other derivative agreements that are becoming more and
more commonplace in large bankruptcy cases.4 Another significant change in
practice is the frequency with which chapter 11 is used as a means of acquir-
ing assets rather than its more historical use of reorganizing a business.5
With these changing dynamics, courts need to reevaluate the use of their
designation power.
Part I of this article begins with an identification of the underlying pur-
pose that creditor voting is intended to fulfill. Part II explores the courts'
traditional use of designation powers to uphold this purpose. In Part III, this
article identifies three major areas in which the courts should expand the use
of designation powers to ensure that voting is serving its intended purpose,
especially in light of modern day practices. It also recognizes one area in
which some courts' current application of this power may be contrary to the
value-maximization goal of chapter 11.
I. THE PURPOSE BEHIND BANKRUPTCY VOTING
Voting serves an efficiency function in bankruptcy similar to shareholder
voting in corporate law. Bankruptcy reorganizations are economically akin to
other fundamental corporate transactions, such as mergers, recapitalizations,
dissolutions and asset sales. Outside of bankruptcy, shareholder voting on
those issues, as well as shareholder voting to elect board members, is based on
the idea that shareholders hold a shared incentive to maximize the value the
corporation.
4See infra Part III for a discussion regarding these types of instruments.
sSee Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 751, 751
(2002) ("Corporate reorganizations have all but disappeared. Giant corporations make headlines when
they file for chapter 11, but they are no longer using it to rescue a firm from imminent failure. Many use
chapter 11 merely to sell their assets and divide up the proceeds."); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmus-
sen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REV. 673, 674 (2003) ("As we claimed in The End of Bank-
ruptcy, traditional reorganizations have largely disappeared."). There may be evidence that this trend is
reversing, however. See Lynn LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Bankruptcy Fire Sales, 106 MicH. L. REV.
1, 42-43 (2007).
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This incentive is arrived at somewhat indirectly. Shareholders do not
specifically care about the value of the corporation, as such, but they are
vitally interested in the value of their shares. Holding the residual claim to
the corporation's earnings, they obtain the marginal gains and losses from
corporate decisions. Because they stand to gain or lose the most, the share-
holders' investment incentives are best aligned with the overall goal of value
maximization.6
In chapter 11, all of the claimants who will be forced to receive some-
thing less than full payment occupy a position that is roughly comparable to
the shareholders of a solvent corporation.7 Chapter 11 places voting power
in the hands of that group of claimants-effectively disregarding the votes of
claimants whose rights are unimpaired8 and the votes of claimants who are
"out of the money."9 Those residual claimants are in the best position to
evaluate the reorganization transactions and to compare their recovery under
the plan to other alternatives, such as liquidation, another potential plan, or
an auction of the business as a going concern. By focusing on the value of
their own claims, creditors occupying the residual class should wind up
choosing a course of action that maximizes the value of the corporation itself.
In both shareholder and bankruptcy voting, sometimes conflicts exist be-
tween the private interests of particular voters and the interests of the other
members of the voting class; which conflicts call into question the efficacy of
the voting process. Outside of bankruptcy, shareholders often do not hold
'See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J. LAW & ECON. 395,
403 (1983) ("As the residual claimants, the shareholders are the group with the appropriate incentives
(collective choice problems to one side) to make discretionary decisions."); see also, Laura Lin, Shift of
Fiduciary Duty Upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of Directors' Duty to Creditors, 46 VAND. L.
REv. 1485, 1497 (1993) ("[Rlequiring directors to maximize shareholder interest provides a fairly accurate
benchmark for maximizing the long-term, wealth-producing capacity of the firm.").
7See Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting II: Importance
and Extensions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 625, 734 (2008) ("Voting in bankruptcy, in proportion to principal
amount of debt held, rests on the same logic as a one-share-one-vote regime on the equity side-that control
rights should be held by those with an incentive to increase the value of the firm, or at least the value of
the asset class that is held.").
'Under 11 U.S.C. § 1124, a class is unimpaired if the plan leaves the legal, equitable and contractual
rights of the holders of claims or interests in the class unaffected. The Code effectively disregards the
voting rights of unimpaired creditors. Under 11 U.S.C. § 1126(f), a class that is unimpaired is conclu-
sively presumed to have accepted the plan and the plan proponent is under no obligation to solicit accept-
ances of the plan.
'See David A. Skeel, The Nature and Effect of Corporate Voting in Chapter II Reorganization Cases,
78 VA. L. REV. 461, 480 (1992) ("[T]he Bankruptcy Code still seems to focus voting authority on the
residual class. The residual class is the first class that will be impaired if the plan proponent seeks to
compensate as many classes in full as the firm's assets will allow. Because unimpaired classes of claims or
interests are deemed to accept a reorganization plan, full compensation eliminates the ability of a class to
vote against the plan. Therefore, the residual class will vote in nearly every chapter 11 case (unless the
reorganization plan proposes to pay the residual owners in full but impairs a higher class), and its vote
frequently will prove pivotal.").
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homogenous incentives.10 For example, managers and employees with stock
ownership of the company may be significantly more risk averse than well
diversified investors. Controlling shareholders may view corporate transac-
tions in a much different light than do the minority shareholders. Pension
funds may be motivated in part by interests in corporate responsibility that
are not shared by other investors. Share ownership by sovereign wealth
funds has created significant concerns regarding the motivations of the sover-
eign controlling the shares. In general, corporate law has not inquired into
the motivations of particular shareholders. It does not have a mechanism for
disqualifying the votes of shareholders with unique or perverse incentives."
Bankruptcy cases involve similar sorts of conflicts, and these conflicts
form the basis for most of the vote designation cases. It is not unusual to find
creditors who have interests separate from those held by otherwise similarly
situated creditors. Trade creditors and labor unions may have an interest in
seeing the debtor continue as an ongoing business, even if that outcome does
not maximize recovery on their claims. On the other end of the spectrum, a
creditor that is well hedged, perhaps through ownership of a total return
swap12 or some other interest that would benefit from the failure of the
debtor to reorganize, might seek liquidation even if it would mean a loss on
that creditor's claim. Some of these conflicts threaten to undermine the
value-maximizing goal of chapter 11.
The problems presented by these conflicts have been exacerbated by
changes in the reorganization landscape. Chapter 11 was once dominated by
creditors and suppliers and other parties in a long-term economic relationship
with the debtor. Today, the process has increasingly come to include claim
buyers who have simply purchased claims, and the accompanying right to
vote, from longer-term, relational creditors.
The claims trading phenomenon has been somewhat controversial. Har-
vey Miller has decried the practice, stating that claims traders' short-term
time horizons have destroyed the "symbiotic relationship of debtor and credi-
tor," making reorganizations less likely as traders "sacrifice the long-term via-
bility of the debtor" for a quick return.' 3 Adam Levitin has praised the
development, noting that a robust market for distressed debt permits early
exit by creditors who do not have the time, expertise or liquidity to partici-
"oShaun Martin & Frank Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 775, 788 ("Homogeneity
of preferences is a key assumption in the law and economics model of corporate voting.").
"See id. at 792-94 (discussing possible conflicting interests); Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie,
One Share, One Vote and the False Promise of Shareholder Homogeneity, 30 CARDozo L. REV. 445, 481-94
(2008) (describing a variety of factors that may affect shareholder homogeneity).
"See infra Part III.A.1.
"Harvey R. Miller, Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases and the Delaware Myth, 55 VAND. L. REV.
1987, 2014, 2016 (2002).
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pate in the chapter 11 process.14 Levitan further argues that claims trading
promotes efficiency by consolidating creditor claims. It also creates a market
for control in bankruptcy that may result in maximizing asset values-either
through a liquidation of the business or through a sale as a going concern.' 5
The chapter 11 supermajority voting requirement makes it somewhat
easier for claims traders to obtain a controlling voice. Each creditor votes as
a member of a class of creditors.16 A class is deemed to have accepted the
plan if at least two-thirds of the dollar amount of claims and more than one-
half of the number of claims held in the class, vote to accept the plan.' 7 This
supermajority provision represents a compromise. It is intended to provide a
creditor with the right to dissent from its proposed treatment under the plan,
but to also eliminate the hold-out problem that often plagues non-bankruptcy
work-outs. Outside of bankruptcy, workouts are made more difficult by a
creditor's natural incentive to delay acceptance of a settlement in hopes that
it will be the last party whose consent is essential to the entire deal. Such a
creditor is in a position to hold out for better treatment under the settlement.
Recognizing that such hold-outs are likely to exist, creditors otherwise in-
clined to accept the settlement offer will be reluctant to enter into a deal that
has not been accepted by everyone. A classic collective action problem, the
hold-out issue stands as a serious obstacle to nonbankruptcy
reorganizations. 18
Bankruptcy reduces, but does not eliminate the hold-out problem. Be-
cause creditors can bind dissenting members through the supermajority vote
requirement, creditors have less of an ability to hold out for better treatment.
On the other hand, the supermajority requirement reduces the number of
claims one must hold, or acquire, to swing the vote. Obtaining either 34% of
the dollar amount of the class claims or 51% of the number of claims will
allow a group or party to control the class vote. Also, the plan proponent
14Adam J. Levitin, Bankruptcy Markets: Making Sense of Claims Trading, 4 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. &
COM. L. 67, 73-74 (2009).
"Id.
16See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123(a)(1), 1126(c), 1129(a)(8), 1129(a)(10) (2006). Chapter 11 voting is con-
ducted by classes of creditors and shareholders, the members of which hold similar claims. Section 1122(a)
provides that "a plan may place a claim or an interest in a particular class only if such claim or interest is
substantially similar to the other claims or interests of such class." 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a). Once classified,
the plan must specify the treatment of the classes of claims or interests, 11 U.S.C. § 1 123(a)(3), and must
provide for the same treatment of all of the claims or interests in each class unless a holder agrees to less
favorable treatment, 11 U.S.C. § 123(a)(4).
"1l U.S.C. § 1126(c). Only those creditors actually voting are counted, however, and claims that are
designated are not counted toward either the total number of acceptances or the total amount and number
of claims. Acceptance by shareholders works the same way, except that there is no requirement that one-
half of the shareholders vote to accept the plan.
"See Zohar Goshen, Controlling Strategic Voting: Property Rule or Liability Rule?, 70 S. CAL. L. REV.
741, 790 (1997) (discussing the hold out problem and the bankruptcy response).
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cannot confirm its plan unless it obtains the acceptance of at least one im-
paired class.' 9 Therefore if a creditor holds a blocking position in the only
class of impaired claims likely to accept the plan, then that creditor can block
the plan in its entirety.20 The acquisition of a blocking position provides a
strategic advantage that often animates vote designation decisions.
Claims trading plays a role in many of the situations discussed in this
article. The presence of claims traders does not necessarily signify the pres-
ence of a conflicting interest or improper motive. But, the market for bank-
ruptcy claims and the nature of the voting process provides opportunities for
creditors with a motive other than to maximize the value of their bankruptcy
distribution, to increase their voice in the bankruptcy process. Thus, while in
many cases claims trading does not form a substantial part of the doctrinal
discussion of vote designation, the fact that a creditor has bought its claims to
increase its control over the process is an important background fact.
II. WIDELY ACCEPTED USES OF THE DESIGNATION POWER
In 1938, Congress adopted § 203 of chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act,
the predecessor to § 1126(e), which gave courts the power to designate
votes. It passed this law in reaction to the case of Texas Hotel Securities
Corp. v. Waco Development Co. 2 1 In this case, a parent corporation, con-
trolled by Conrad Hilton, bought up claims in order to block the debtor's
plan. Hilton's purpose was to attempt to reacquire hotel assets that the en-
tity had earlier transferred to the debtor. Finding that the Hilton entity had
the intent to thwart the debtor from confirming any plan of reorganization,
the district court refused to count its votes. 22 The Fifth Circuit rejected the
lower court's view, finding that Texas Hotel Securities' intent was not
"wholly obstructive," and that instead it simply hoped for a "lawful advan-
tage to be openly gained."23 The Fifth Circuit held that, given that Texas
Hotel Securities' actions were not "in malice or to embarrass justice, or sur-
reptitiously to sell its vote," the court lacked the authority to disregard the
votes, 24 and denied confirmation of the plan on the basis of Texas Hotel
Securities' objection.25 Congress responded quickly to rectify this omission
with the passage of § 1126(e)'s predecessor.
'9 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10).
20See, e.g., Principal Mut. Life Ins. v. Lakeside Assocs. (In re DeLuca), 194 B.R. 797, 801 (Bankr. E.D.
Va. 1996) (noting that the secured creditor bought a blocking position in the only impaired class that
might have assented to the debtor's plan).
2 Tex. Hotel Sec. Corp. v. Waco Dev. Co., 87 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1936).221d. at 397.
23Id. at 399.
241d.
25 d. at 400-01.
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In one of the earliest cases to interpret the new good faith requirement,
In re Pine Hill Collieries Co.,26 the court held that votes based on an "ulterior
motive" must be designated. "[P]ure malice, 'strikes' and blackmail, and the
purpose to destroy an enterprise in order to advance the interests of a com-
peting business, all plainly constituting bad faith, are motives which may be
accurately described as ulterior."27 The court was careful to distinguish ac-
tions that are merely self-interested, noting that
What is selfishness from the standpoint of those who derive
no benefit from conduct under scrutiny often becomes en-
lightened self interest if viewed from the standpoint of those
who gain by it. If a selfish motive were sufficient to condemn
reorganization policies of interested parties, very few, if any,
would pass muster.28
The court recognized that conflicts are inevitable and that a mere disagree-
ment over the proper course of action does not warrant disqualification. Nor
did it denounce the practice of purchasing claims to block plan confirmation.
"[T]here must be more evidence of an ulterior purpose than the mere fact
that the controlling votes were acquired during the progress of the proceed-
ings, without regard to their intrinsic value and for the purpose of defeating
the plan."29
Courts today continue to make this same distinction between ulterior
motives that justify designation and the merely self-interested reasons by
which all creditors appraise a proposed plan.30 Thus, acting in a self-inter-
ested manner is not prohibited. In fact, if the ultimate goals of reorganization
are to be accomplished, creditors must vote their self-interests. These are the
distributional goals that, in theory at least, will further the ultimate goal of
maximizing the value of the estate's assets. What is antithetical to this value-
maximization goal is for creditors to vote for a reason that is contrary to their
distributional goals. An ulterior motive exists then when the creditor votes
to further an interest unrelated to its interests as a creditor. An ulterior
motive also exists when, although the creditor is voting to further its interest
as a creditor, it does so to blackmail the plan proponent into giving it some-
thing further to which it is not entitled. The Supreme Court concluded that
§ 203 of the Bankruptcy Act was meant to disqualify the votes of creditors
26In re Pine Hill Collieries Co., 46 F. Supp. 669, 671 (E.D. Pa. 1942) ("No decision has been brought to
my attention, nor have I found any, dealing with 'good faith' in Section 203 of Chapter X [of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 603].").
27Id.
281d.
29
M.
soE.g., In re Bataa/Kierland, LLC, 476 B.R. 558, 567 n. 30 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2012).
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"whose selfish purpose was to obstruct a fair and feasible reorganization in
the hope that someone would pay them more than the ratable equivalent of
their proportionate part of the bankrupt assets."3 1
Discerning a creditor's true motivation is necessarily a fact intensive in-
quiry.3 2 It is also a determination that must be arrived at carefully. In In re
Adelphia Communications, Corp., the court stated that the "ability to vote
on a reorganization plan is one of the most sacred entitlements that a creditor
has in a chapter 11 case. And in my view, it should not be denied except for
highly egregious conduct . . . ."3 On the other hand, § 1126(e) and its prede-
cessor were enacted specifically to permit the court the flexibility to police
the voting process.
While there are some areas in which courts need to expand their use of
the designation power, they have not been hesitant to use it in the five areas
outlined below. These five areas reveal some common threads. Voting must
be based on an assessment of the viability of the debtor's business or the
value of its assets, uninfluenced by an outside economic interest that would
benefit from the debtor's lessened chances of a successful reorganization. In
addition, voting must not be used as a means to extort something to which
the creditor is not entitled or to undermine the important checks and bal-
ances built into the plan solicitation and approval process. In all of these
situations, courts appear to be motivated by a desire to assure that the voting
process aligns with chapter 1i's value-maximizing goal.
A. THE COMPETITOR: MOTIVE TO DESTROY DEBTOR'S BUSINESS
Perhaps the most obvious form of an ulterior motive is the attempt to
eliminate the debtor as a competitor. In In re McLeod Co., Inc., the court
disqualified the "no" votes of a group of former employees.34 It held that
their votes violated the good faith standard of § 1126(e) because they had
been cast "for the ulterior purpose of destroying or injuring debtor in its
business so that the interests of the competing business with which the
named individuals were associated, could be furthered."3 5 The objectives of
the bankruptcy process do not include the liquidation of viable businesses.
"Young v. Higbee Co., 324 U.S. 204, 211 (1945) (citing Hearings on Revision of the Bankruptcy Act
before the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. on H.R.
6439, Serial 9, pp. 180-182).
"For this reason, the standard of review applied on appeal is the clearly erroneous standard afforded
to factual findings. Figter Ltd. v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. (In re Figter Ltd.), 118 F.3d 635,
638 (9th Cit. 1997); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Loop 76, LLC (In re Loop 76, LLC), 465 B.R. 525, 544
(B.A.P. 9th Cit. 2012) ("In considering that standard of review, . . . we must afford the bankruptcy court
great deference regarding the credibility of witnesses . . . ." (citing Retz v. Samson (In re Retz), 606 F.3d
1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2010))).
3"In re Adelphia Commc'ns Corp., 359 B.R. 54, 56-57 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006).
34In re MacLeod Co., 63 B.R. 654, 655-66 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1986).
3'Id. at 656.
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The debtor in this case may or may not have been viable, but the bankruptcy
court was unwilling to count the vote of claimants who had a demonstrable
incentive to liquidate the debtor regardless of its viability. This form of ulte-
rior motive is usually well known to the debtor and, thus, the debtor will
have no difficulty in bringing it to the attention of the court.
B. THE BLACKMAILER: MOTIVE TO EXTORT BEYOND CREDITOR'S
RIGHTS
Using votes or the threat of a negative vote to extract a greater share of
the estate than is paid to other similarly situated creditors is another tradi-
tional basis for designation. The Supreme Court considered this ulterior mo-
tive indirectly in Young v. Higbee.36 Here, two preferred shareholders
objected to the debtor's plan, claiming that certain insider debts provided for
in the plan should be subordinated. The bankruptcy court nevertheless con-
firmed the plan. After the two objecting shareholders appealed, the insiders
then offered them a settlement, which the shareholders accepted, that paid
them substantially more than the market price for their shares in order to get
them to drop the appeal. Offended by this practice, the Supreme Court or-
dered the shareholders to turn over the profits they realized by "selling out"
the entire class of preferred shareholders. The Court disapproved of this use
of litigation tactics to extract additional consideration. In dicta, the Court
mentioned that, had these shareholders cast their votes for such an improper
purpose, their votes might be designated under the new statute. It explained
the purpose of the pre-Code vote designation statute was to:
prevent creditors from participating who "by the use of ob-
structive tactics and hold-up techniques exact for themselves
undue advantages from the other stockholders who are coop-
erating." Bad faith was to be attributed to claimants who
opposed a plan for a time until they were "bought off'; those
who "refused to vote in favor of a plan unless ... given some
particular preferential advantage."37
In In re Featherworks Corp.,38 the court applied the Supreme Court's
dicta in Young. It designated the claim of a secured creditor who, upon re-
ceiving a payment from the debtor's corporate parent, sought to change its
"no" vote on the debtor's plan to an acceptance.39 The court made clear that
36Young v. Higbee Co., 324 U.S. 204 (1945).
"Id. at 211 n.10 (quoting Hearings on Revision of the Bankruptcy Act before the Committee on the
Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. on H.R. 6439, Serial 9, pp. 180.82).
38In re Featherworks Corp., 25 B.R. 634 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982), affd, 36 BR. 460 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)
39Id. at 641.
2013) 163
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the purpose of the prohibition against side payments is necessary to assure
that the voting process accomplishes its economic objective:
The Code depends upon the self-interest of the creditors to
act as a barrier against abuse of the bankruptcy laws. If a
majority in number and amount of all creditors vote for a
plan, there is good reason to believe that that plan is in the
best interest of all creditors, since it would not receive such
a vote otherwise. However, if any creditor receives some
special consideration peculiar to him, his vote is no longer
disinterested and unbiased and the Code's built-in controls
are neutralized.40
Side payments mask the informational value of the vote and interfere, not
only with the distributional equity, but also with the value-maximizing func-
tion of the process. It is, therefore, easy to see why the courts would disqual-
ify votes in such circumstances. 41
C. THE INTIMIDATOR: UNFAIR DISCRIMINATION AND COERCION IN
THE ACQUISITION OF CLAIMS
Another traditional basis for designating votes focuses on the process em-
ployed to acquire claims, rather than on the post-purchase behavior of the
party who acquired the claims. When claims purchasing results in unfair
discrimination between selling and non-selling creditors, courts have desig-
nated the purchased claims. One of the first cases to designate votes on this
basis was In re P-R Holding Corp.42 The details of the facts in this case are
sketchy, but it appears that two parties had proposed a plan of reorganization
to acquire the debtor. The plan offered creditors a combination of cash and
mostly new securities, representing payment of 50% of the face amount of the
claims. When it did not appear that the plan had the necessary votes for
approval, the referee extended voting for an extra day. The plan proponents
went to work, primarily purchasing votes that had previously been cast
against the plan. To purchase the claims, the plan proponents offered an all-
cash payment of 50% of the face value of the claims. The SEC objected to
01d. Two commentators have also noted that the court in Featherworks seemed to come very close to
making a criminal referral on the basis of this conduct. Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas M. Mayer, Trading
Claims and Taking Control of Corporations in Chapter 11, 12 CARDOzo L. REV. 1, 99 (1990); Sally S.
Neely, Claims Trading and Disqualification of Votes: Derivation, History, DBSD North America and Adel-
phia, in Chapter 11 Business Reorganizations, at n.3 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, April 28-29, 2011),
available at Westlaw SS029 ALI-ABA 137.
"See Windsor on the River Assocs., Ltd. v. Balcor Real Estate Fin., Inc. (In re Windsor on the River
Assocs., Ltd.), 7 F.3d 127, 132 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating that one of the primary functions of bankruptcy
law is "to discourage 'side dealing' between the shareholders of a corporation and some creditors to the
detriment of other creditors").
4
2In re P-R Holding Corp., 147 F.2d 895 (2d Cir. 1945).
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this practice because it left the non-selling creditors with less favorable terms
under the plan since they would receive a combination of cash and securities,
rather than the all-cash payment given to the selling creditors.
The Second Circuit was careful to first note that it was not bad faith per
se to acquire claims or even to do so for the purpose of buying the necessary
votes to control the confirmation process. Nor did it erect an outright prohi-
bition on the use of claims purchasing to gain the ability to acquire the
debtor, although it acknowledged that this acquisition motivation "may
amount to 'bad faith.'"4 Although the case may be read to condemn the
creditors' motive to acquire the business, in fact, the court was far more con-
cerned with the discriminatory nature of the purchases.44
Discrimination in the treatment of similar claims is a concern because it
may have a coercive effect on creditors. Coercion arises because the creditors
are caught in a bind, not knowing whether to accept the offer in hand or to
take their chances with a plan. Like the classic two-tiered tender offers of
the 1980s, 45 claims purchases that do not promise all creditors in a class equal
treatment may leave the creditors, facing the prospect of an uncertain payout
under a plan of reorganization, with little choice but to sell their claims to the
claim buyer.46 Not only does this hurt the creditors, but it also has the po-
tential to interfere with the value-maximizing function of bankruptcy voting.
First, the claims purchaser acquires a blocking vote for less because it creates
a buying and selling frenzy. Having acquired a controlling voice, the claim
buyer may propose a plan that offers less for the debtor's assets than others
might offer in a truly competitive environment.
The acquisition-based motive and the coercive nature of the plan propo-
nents' actions in P.R. Holding caused the Second Circuit to affirm the desig-
nation of the purchasers' votes. But interestingly, it rejected the SEC's
request to "preserve the integrity of the reorganization process" by reversing
the confirmation order.47 Instead, the claim buyers agreed not to take any
compensation for those claims, to distribute the cash that would have been
4old. at 897.
4Having found that the claim buyers were acting in bad faith, the court considered two further
questions. The first question addressed by the opinion is whether the "yes" votes should merely be dis-
qualified; or, instead, counted as -no" votes. If the court counted the votes in accordance with the pre,
purchase "no" votes by the selling creditors, the plan could not be confirmed. Simply disqualifying the
votes would result in the approval of the plan by the requisite claimholders. The court did not convert
the votes, stating that that action would allow parties who no longer held an interest in the plan to
control its acceptance and would disregard the affirmative votes of the remaining creditors. Id. at 898.
4sSee Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 956 (Del. 1985) (describing the coercive
effect of such an offer).
46See Richard D. Thomas, Comment, Tipping the Scales in Chapter 11: How Distressed Debt Investors
Decrease Debtor Leverage and the Efficacy of Business Reorganization, 27 EMORY BANKR. DEv.J. 213, 237-
39 (2010) (comparing debt purchases under these circumstances to coercive tender offers).
7n re P-R Holding Corp., 147 F.2d at 899.
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paid on those claims to the other creditors, and to reduce a mortgage obliga-
tion. The court noted that this new offer by the proponents was the best
available and made the plan even more attractive. By allowing the confirma-
tion order to stand, securing the plan proponents' added value, and counting
only the remaining votes to satisfy the supermajority requirement, the court
demonstrated that the underlying goal in this area is to achieve the greatest
return for the creditors by maximizing the value of the business assets.
D. THE CHEATER: CIRCUMVENTING THE PLAN PROCESS
The chapter 11 confirmation process provides important limitations on
the behavior of plan proponents, which limitations are designed to assure that
creditor votes accurately reflect creditors' informed judgments and are unin-
fluenced by strategic behavior or misinformation. Notably, § 1125(b) prohib-
its the solicitation of acceptances or rejections of a plan prior to the
dissemination of a disclosure statement containing 'adequate information."48
In addition, bankruptcy courts are authorized to fix a time period for vot-
ing,49 and retain discretion regarding the debtor's exclusivity period,5o and
the scheduling of hearings on competing plans.5 These provisions provide
the court with substantial control over the plan process-control that may be
necessary to assure a full consideration of alternative plans. Interference with
that control, therefore, may provide grounds for a finding of bad faith suffi-
cient to justify disqualifying a creditor's vote.
In re Allegheny International Inc. is perhaps the most famous example of a
court using its designation powers to counter a would-be acquirer's efforts to
circumvent the confirmation process. 52 In that case, Japonica Partners, the
potential acquirer, bought a small amount of subordinated debentures imme-
diately prior to the debtor's filing of a plan and disclosure statement. Relying
on its newly-acquired creditor status, Japonica filed a plan just before the
conclusion of the disclosure statement hearings on the debtor's plan.53 Japon-
411 U.S.C. § 1125(b) (2006). Section 1125(a)(1) imposes a contextual test for adequacy, stating that
the information must be of a kind and detail that is "reasonably practicable in light of the nature and
history of the debtor and the condition of the debtor's books and records" and requires information that
would "enable such a hypothetical investor ... to make an informed judgment about the plan." 11 U.S.C.
§ 1125(a)(1).
49FED. R. BANKR. P. 3017(c).
'11 U.S.C. § 1121(d) (permitting the court, for cause, to extend or limit debtor exclusivity).
siSee Colo. Mountain Express, Inc. v. Aspen Limousine Serv., Inc. (In re Aspen Limousine Serv., Inc.),
193 B.R. 325, 332-33 (D. Colo. 1996) (permitting voting on the debtor's plan prior to consideration of
competing plan, notwithstanding the expiration of the exclusivity period in a small business case.); see also
FED. R. BANKR. P. 3016 advisory committee notes (1996 Amendments) (discussing a change in FED. R.
BANKR. P. 3016 and noting that the change "does not affect the court's discretion with respect to the
scheduling of hearings on the approval of disclosure statements when more than one plan has been filed.").
52In re Allegheny Int'l Inc., 118 B.R. 282 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990).
"Id. at 286.
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ica envisioned a distribution of both plans and a joint ballot. The court set
separate schedules for confirmation, but promised that it would give creditors
an opportunity to vote on the Japonica plan before entering any confirmation
order.54
Unsatisfied with competing on this basis, Japonica immediately began
purchasing claims in a strategy to win confirmation of its plan. The strategy,
which the court described as "chutzpah with a vengeance," involved the
purchase of a blocking position in secured claims held by bank lenders.55 Ja-
ponica acquired 33.87% of the claims for a price of up to 95% of face
amount.56 This purchase effectively gave Japonica a veto over any consensual
plan of reorganization-a status that the court found sufficient to justify
designating Japonica's vote.
The Allegheny court also recognized the general rule that a creditor may
purchase claims for the purpose of influencing the vote on a plan, but where
the creditor does so "in aid of an interest other than an interest as a creditor,
such purchases may amount to 'bad faith"'57 The court found Japonica's pur-
pose was to take over the debtor and to control the reorganization progress.
But it was not simply Japonica's desire for control that led the court to desig-
nate the votes. Japonica launched a public tender offer for the debtor's subor-
dinated debentures before the court approved Japonica's disclosure statement,
a move that the court characterized as an "end run" around the bankruptcy
process. 58 In addition, as a plan proponent, Japonica had sought and received
inside information to enable it to fashion its plan and disclosure statement.
Although Japonica was entitled to that information, the court concluded that
Japonica "exploited its special access to information, personnel and the prem-
ises of the debtor to attempt to assert its influence and control."59 Overall,
the court found, "a pervasive pattern of bad faith designed to control the
debtor and manipulate the bankruptcy process."60
Allegheny stands for the principle that claims buyers who seek control
must work within the statutory plan confirmation process. This principle is
consistent with the goals underlying bankruptcy voting. Although the value-
maximizing goals of chapter 11 might be advanced by the presence of compet-
ing bidders under competing plans, the process cannot become a free-for-all.
The role of the court is to set out an orderly process for creditor considera-
tion and to maintain control over it.
"4Id.
"Id. at 297.
16Id. at 287.
"Id. at 289 (quoting In re P-R Holding, 147 F.2d 895, 897 (2d Cir. 1945)).
81d. at 295.
59 1d. at 298.
6"Id. at 299.
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E. THE CONSPIRATOR: CONFLICTING THIRD PARTY AGREEMENTS
The final traditional basis for designation arises when a creditor is voting
its claims to further an economic interest set forth in an agreement with a
third party that is contrary to its interests as a creditor. A classic example of
this situation is illustrated by In re Dune Deck Owners Corp.61 There, the
secured creditor, KHD, purchased a sufficient number of unsecured claims to
allow it to block the debtor's plan. Finding nothing amiss in the acquisition
of the claims, the court nevertheless ordered an evidentiary hearing to inquire
further into this creditor's motivation. The record contained "evidence that
the creditor has voted without regard to the treatment of its claim, but in-
stead, to achieve some benefit or goal inconsistent with interests of the estate
and its creditors, [and, therefore,] the Court must inquire into those motives
in order to preserve the integrity of the chapter 11 process."62
In Dune Deck, the debtor owned an apartment building, turned co-opera-
tive, and held a long term lease of the land on which the building sat. The
sponsor of the debtor's conversion to a co-operative owned other contiguous,
but separately incorporated, co-operatives. Together these properties com-
prised a resort. In marketing the debtor's units, the sponsor touted the unit
owner's ability to enjoy the common areas of the resort, including a bath and
tennis club and the marina. It recorded a Declaration of Covenants, Restric-
tions, Easements, Charges and Liens (the "Declaration"), granting reciprocal
rights to the various properties to enjoy these common areas.
The bank that had been the debtor's original lender sold its secured posi-
tion to another entity. That entity, in turn, assigned its rights to KHD. The
latter assignment was subject to a side agreement that provided an incentive
for KHD to foreclose on the property and terminate the Declarations. Al-
though not fully disclosed in this decision, it appears that KHD and/or its
predecessor held other interests in the resort that might benefit from the
termination of the Declaration through such a foreclosure. The court
surmised that the debtor's property would suffer a corresponding decrease in
value if it were to lose the rights granted in the Declaration. The court found
KHD's side agreement required an evidentiary hearing as to whether KHD's
opposition to the plan was motivated by its business judgment that it would
realize more on its secured claim through foreclosure, or whether it was moti-
vated by an economic interest in its agreement with its assignor, involving
the termination of the Declaration. If it were the latter, the court forecasted
that it would designate the creditor's votes.
In re Landing Associates, Ltd. presented a closer call. 63 As part of its
6 'In re Dune Deck Owners Corp., 175 B.R. 839 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995).
621d. at 845.
6 In re Landing Assocs., Ltd., 157 B.R. 791 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1993).
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purchase of the debtor's loan from the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation ("FSLIC"), Bank United entered into an Assistance Agreement
with FSLIC. It provided financial incentives to the bank for managing the
various assets covered by the agreement, including the debtor's apartment
building. Under this agreement, Bank United was entitled to receive guaran-
teed yield payments if it incurred losses on any non-performing asset that it
continued to manage. On the other hand, if it liquidated the asset for more
than its adjusted book value, Bank United would be allowed to keep ten
percent of the profit, free of any tax consequences. These incentives, how-
ever, were only available to it until December 31, 1995. The debtor had
proposed a ten-year plan, with a large balloon payment due in 2003 at the
earliest. Thus, the Assistance Agreement created an immediate incentive for
Bank United to reject any reorganization plan in favor of foreclosure.
The court acknowledged that this side agreement had motivated the bank
to reject the plan. On the other hand, it found the agreement's effect to be
little different than the motivation of many secured creditors who vote to
resist reorganization based on a "'return on investment' concern that moti-
vates them to favor immediate liquidation in lieu of reorganization, so that
the investor's money tied up in the loan can be reinvested at more favorable
rates."64 Perhaps more importantly, the court was hesitant because "then the
same charge could be leveled at the RTC and the FDIC in their administra-
tion of the assets of failed institutions-a result this court, with some misgiv-
ings, nonetheless shrinks from."65 Consequently, the court found this case
presented "an admixture of creditor-related and non-creditor-related mo-
tives."66 Based on the fact that the creditor could articulate several creditor-
related reasons for its vote against the plan, the court did not designate the
vote.67
Both Landing Associates and Dune Deck involved third party agreements
which gave the creditor a financial incentive to vote against reorganization,
regardless of the terms proposed in the plan. While it is possible to distin-
guish the contrary results in these cases, as discussed in the next part, there
exists a good argument that Landing Associates was wrongly decided.
64
d. at 807.
6sId. at 809 (emphasis in original).
66Id. at 808.
67Although the court did not designate Bank United's vote, it took great pains to issue several stern
lectures to the creditor regarding its extremely litigious behavior in this case, which it attributed to the fee
reimbursement provisions of the Assistance Agreement, drafted by the FSLIC. Id. at 808-09; see also
Fleming, infra note 75 at, 206-08 (discussing of this aspect of Landing Assoc.).
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III. EXPANDING AND CONTRACTING THE USE OF
DESIGNATION POWERS
There are four areas in which the designation power should be either
expanded or contracted to more closely align voting with chapter 1i's value-
maximization goal. The first is a continuation of the discussion immediately
above regarding the need to expand its use to cover outside influences con-
tained in third party agreements that motivate a creditor to vote against any
plan of the debtor. The second involves the use of voting as a tactic to
benefit the creditor in significant litigation with the debtor or a trustee. In
this area, courts generally have not been willing to exercise their designation
power, but this reluctance should be revisited. Third, on a case-specific basis,
courts should consider expanding the use of this power to prevent creditors
from voting their interests in one class only to benefit their interests in an-
other class of claims. Finally, the power should not be used, as it currently is,
to prevent would-be acquirers from voting against the debtor's plan and in
favor of their own competing plan to purchase the debtor's assets. The estate
may benefit greatly from this form of competitive bidding for the assets.
A. THE GAMBLER: SWAPS AND OTHER DERIVATIVE AGREEMENTS
In Part 11,68 this article discussed the mixed reaction of the courts in
Dune Deck6 9 and Landing Associates70 toward third party agreements that
give a creditor an economic incentive to reject any plan filed by the debtor.
In Dune Deck, the court set an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the
agreement between the debtor's primary secured lender and its assignor obli-
gated it to follow a pre-arranged course of action designed to force the elimi-
nation of restrictive covenants that benefitted the debtor's property, but
burdened the lender's other property. If so, then its vote was based on its
interest as an adjacent property owner, not as a creditor. In Landing Associ-
ates, the creditor voted to block the plan so that it could obtain relief to
foreclose. If successful, under its agreement with FSLIC, it had the potential
to realize tax-free profits on the property's resale, but only if it could fore-
close before the FSLIC agreement expired.
It is possible to distinguish these two cases. The Dune Deck creditor
may have voted its interest as an adjacent property owner, while the Landing
Associates creditor was trying to maximize its recovery as a lender. But in
both cases, a separate agreement had shifted the creditor's decision away from
a consideration of the viability of the debtor's business and the value of its
assets toward another financial incentive set forth in a third party agreement.
"8See supra Part II.E.
"In re Dune Deck Owners Corp., 175 BR. 839 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995).
70In re Landing Assocs., Ltd., 157 B.R. 791 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1993)
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Although the Landing Associates court was correct in noting that the
creditor had a legitimate interest in maximizing its recovery on the loan, the
recovery would come not from maximizing the value of the estate, but instead
from the FSLIC interest. When an outside interest skews voting away from
a decision based on the best possible recovery from the estate and its assets,
then the vote is no longer serving the value-maximization policy of chapter
11. Thus courts should require that the creditor's vote be based on an assess-
ment of the viability of the debtor's business and/or the value of the debtor's
assets, uninfluenced by an outside economic interest that would benefit from
outcomes that do not maximize the value of the assets. The need to adopt
this view is especially important today in this era of distressed-debt investing
and the proliferation of derivative agreements. These new practices, dis-
cussed below, have given many creditors undisclosed economic incentives to
vote their claims in pursuit of the debtor's demise.
1. A Brief Primer on Equity and Credit Derivatives
An increasing body of corporate law scholarship has examined the poten-
tial that derivatives, short sales and other financial instruments commonly
employed today may skew the incentives of individual shareholders away
from the interests of the group.7' Similar arrangements exist in the credit
world. These types of instruments may decouple the holder's voting rights
from its true economic interests. Before discussing the need to designate
votes cast by creditors holding such instruments, it is important for the unini-
tiated to understand the nature of these relationships.
A shareholder who has hedged the economic risk of its investment may
hold voting power greater than its economic exposure, a phenomenon known
as "empty voting."72 For example, a shareholder may hold both "long" and
"short" positions in a security. The long position involves securities pur-
chased with the expectation that the security will increase in value. In a
short position, an investor borrows stock from a broker and sells that stock
on the open market. Eventually, the investor must return the borrowed se-
curity to the broker by buying it back on the open market. If the stock has
fallen in price, as the investor anticipated, then the investor may buy it back
on the market for less than the amount received in the earlier sale, thereby
generating a profit. When the investor holds both long and short positions, it
has hedged its investment, should the value of the security rise or fall. At
any point in time, if the investor has sold short the same number of shares as
"See, e.g., Hu & Black, supra note 7, at 640-43 (discussing decoupling of voting power and economic
risk through the use of equity derivatives); Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds In Corporate
Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 1021, 1075-77 (2007) (discussing conflicts of
interest caused by hedging strategies).
72Hu & Black, supra note 7, at 638 ("We refer to anyone who has substantially greater voting than
economic ownership as an 'empty voter.'").
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the shareholder owns, it would have voting power on the shares owned out-
right; but, because of the short position, the shareholder would hold no eco-
nomic interest in the corporation. An increase in the value of the
corporation, and thus in the share price, would benefit the shareholder's long
position, but that gain would be offset by an equal loss in the shareholder's
short position.73
In an extreme case, a shareholder holding a "net-short position" would
benefit from actions that reduce the value of the shares that the shareholder
is voting. A net-short position is one in which the shareholder's short posi-
tion is greater than his or her long position. Assume that a shareholder has
sold twice as many shares short as that shareholder owns. That shareholder
would benefit from a decrease in the value of those shares twice as much as
the shareholder would lose on the shares owned outright. Thus, the share-
holder would have an incentive to vote in ways that would cause the corpo-
ration to lose money.74
Creditors can also wind up with incentives that do not match those that
are held by other creditors. Credit default and total return swaps are instru-
ments in which a third party agrees to make payments to compensate the
buyer of the swap for losses caused by credit events or the deterioration of
the value of the credit instruments. In a credit default swap, one party, the
"protection buyer," pays a fee to a "protection seller" in exchange for the
protection seller's agreement to make payments when the entity issuing the
underlying credit instrument defaults, files a bankruptcy, or restructures its
debts (the swap agreement normally defines the type of events that consti-
tute "credit events"). The payment, or "settlement," often takes the form of a
cash payment equal to the difference between the market value of the debt
instrument post-credit event, and some fixed "notional value" defined in the
swap agreement.75 The "notional value" could be the principal amount of the
debt, the market value at the time the swap is created, or it could be some
other value determined by the parties-it is simply the benchmark value be-
low which the protection buyer has purchased its protection.
Assume, for example, a creditor has purchased a credit default swap on a
bond with a notional value of $1,000. If the debtor's default causes the mar-
ket value of the bond to decline to $500, the protection seller will make a
"See Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 775, 778 (2005)
(describing the offsetting effect of short and long positions in stock).
Id.; see also Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership:
Taxonomy, Implications and Reform, 61 Bus. LAW. 1011, 1052 (2006) (describing a net short voting
scenario).
75See Patrick D. Fleming, Credit Derivatives Can Create a Financial Incentive for Creditors to Destroy
a Chapter 11 Debtor: Section 1126(e) and Section 105(a) Provide a Solution, 17 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV.
189, 193-94 (2009).
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payment of $500 to the protection buyer. In this way credit default swaps
act as insurance against losses caused by defined credit events.
A total return swap works roughly the same way, but does not rely on a
credit event. In a total return swap, the parties make periodic payments
based on the difference between the market price of the debt and the swap's
notional value. When the market value is below the notional amount, the
protection seller makes a payment to the protection buyer, and when the
market value is higher, the protection buyer makes a payment to the protec-
tion seller.76 For example, if the holder of a bond with a market value of
$1,000 enters into a $1,000 notional value total return swap as a protection
buyer, that holder has completely eliminated his economic risk of holding the
bond. If the value declines, the bondholder receives payments equal to the
amount of the decline. If the value increases, the bondholder will make pay-
ments equal to the increase.
Thus, these instruments, like equity derivatives, also create a potential for
empty voting. The owner of the bond is permitted to vote under the inden-
ture, or in a bankruptcy case, despite the fact that it no longer holds an
equivalent economic interest. Even worse, the fact that derivatives can be
purchased in amounts exceeding the actual amount of debt holdings creates
the possibility that voting creditors may hold a net-short position. For exam-
ple, assume a creditor holding 10,000 bonds each with a value of $1,000 has
purchased protection in the form of a total return on 20,000 bonds each with
a notional value of $1,000. Assuming that the company liquidates and suffers
a severe decline in market value, the losses on the protection buyer's long
position (its $10 million claim) would be offset by payment on the swap by a
2:1 margin. This creditor is "net short" by $10 million, and yet has the power
to vote its $10 million claim. Such creditors would benefit on the derivatives
more by a failure of the corporation and loss on the debt than they would
lose on their credit claim and, thus, have an incentive to vote for value mini-
mizing actions-such as the liquidation of a viable company.
2. Expanding the Use of the Designation Power and Bankruptcy
Rule 2019 to Address Net Short Positions
No cases have directly addressed the problem of creditors voting claims
where they hold a net short position. One bankruptcy judge, however, has
made clear in dicta that he would designate the claims of such creditors. In
In re DBSD, the court described an earlier case it had presided over, In re
Adelphia Communications, in which a designation motion had been filed
against two distressed debt investors holding net short positions.77 The mo-
76Id. at 195-96.
771n re DBSD North Am., Inc., 421 B.R. 133, 142 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (discussing In re Adelphia
Commc'ns Corp., 359 B.R. 54 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006)).
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tion was later withdrawn when it became clear that those investors' votes
would not have mattered, but Judge Gerber in DBSD wrote of that earlier
case:
If the motion had not been withdrawn, and if the evidence
the Court heard was not refuted, the Court would have des-
ignated their votes in a heartbeat. Profiting from another
constituency's pain or from losses to everybody from delay in
the case would be a classic example of an unprotected ulte-
rior motive.78
Commentators agree with Judge Gerber's sentiments.79
The likely reason courts have not yet addressed the conflicts created by
derivatives and similar financial instruments is because it is not easy to know
when a creditor holds one of these instruments. Recently amended Bank-
ruptcy Rule 2019 now imposes limited disclosure requirements aimed at
these types of arrangements. In general, this rule requires every group or ad
hoc committee that represents multiple creditors or equity security holders in
a chapter 9 or 11 case to file verified statements as to every "disclosable
economic interest" held by the group. These interests include "any claim,
interest, pledge, lien, option, participation, derivative instrument, or any
other right or derivative right granting the holder an economic interest that
is affected by the value, acquisition, or disposition of a claim or interest."80
Failure to comply may result in a loss of standing to "be heard or to intervene
in the case."81 It also may cause the court to "hold invalid any authority,
acceptance, rejection, or objection given, procured, or received by the entity,
7
8Id. at 142 n.44.
79See Fleming, supra note 75, at 208-09 ("A court would likely not hesitate to find that a creditor is
not advancing an interest as a creditor qua creditor when his vote is motivated by an interest in a third
party contract, such as a [credit default swap] or a [total return swap], that results in a desire to destroy
value in his claim."); Daniel J. Bussel & Kenneth N. Klee, Recalibrating Consent in Bankruptcy, 83 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 663, 734 (2009) (suggesting the need for more disclosure and a more aggressive use of
§ 1126(e) as a response to the problems posed by credit derivatives); Samuel M. Kidder, Comment, What's
Your Position? Amending the Bankruptcy Disclosure Rules to Keep Pace with Financial Innovation, 58
UCLA L. REv. 803, 840 (2011) ("Judge Gerber's opinion in In re DBSD] would seem to lend strong
support to courts seeking to designate the votes of empty and net short creditors who vote against the
best interests of the estate for the purpose of profiting on their short positions."); see also, Hu & Black,
supra note 7, at 734 ("Voting in bankruptcy, in proportion to principal amount of debt held, rests on the
same logic as a one-share-one-vote regime on the equity side-that control rights should be held by those
with an incentive to increase the value of the firm, or at least the value of the asset class that is held.
Large-scale, hidden debt decoupling weakens our ability to rely on these assumptions."); Douglas G. Baird
& Robert K. Rasmussen, Antibankruptcy, 119 YALE LUJ. 648, 651 (2010) (noting that "failure of the
business can mean large returns to some creditors.").
soFED. R. BANKR. P. 2019(a)(1). The rule was recently amended effective December 1, 2011 to clearly
include ad hoc committees.
axFED. R. BANKR. P. 2019(e)(2)(A) .
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group, or committee." 82 The rule's reference to acceptances and rejections no
doubt refers to votes cast on a plan of reorganization.
This rule is inadequate for several reasons. First, it only applies to
groups, not individual creditors. Second, it only applies when the group "rep-
resents" multiple creditors or security holders. "'[R]epresents' means to take
a position before the court or to solicit votes regarding the confirmation of a
plan on behalf of another.""8  Thus, the rule does not apply to an individual
creditor, who acts alone, does not solicit other votes, and does not object to
confirmation. It does not apply even though this individual creditor may hold
a conflicting interest, such as a derivative agreement, and may be in a position
to control the vote of the class in which it holds claims. Thus, the rule is not
sufficiently inclusive.8 4
Nor are the sanctions for non-compliance sufficient. Assume that a group
holds a swap agreement, fails to disclose it, votes and solicits other votes to
reject the plan, and objects to confirmation. Assuming the debtor somehow
discovers the swaps held by the group and brings the non-disclosure to the
court's attention, the court may then overrule the confirmation objection and
disqualify the votes.85 This leaves the group no worse off than it would have
been if it had made the disclosure. As a result, it has every incentive to try to
get away with non-disclosure, hoping the debtor will not discover its con-
flicting interests. While the rule also contains a catch-all provision allowing
the court to "grant other appropriate relief,"86 it is unclear whether a court
will interpret that authority so broadly as to allow monetary sanctions, in-
cluding punitive damages, or to otherwise affect the substantive property
interests of these parties. This is particularly true because the examples of
sanctions set forth in the rule are merely aimed at limiting the group's voice
in the bankruptcy proceedings.
Consequently, the pernicious effect of swap agreements and similar finan-
cial incentives may go largely unchecked by Rule 2019 in its current form.
Nevertheless, the amendments to the rule are a step in the right direction.
They represent a Congressional acknowledgement of the corrupting influence
of these outside interests. But both the rule's scope of coverage and its sanc-
tions for non-compliance should be expanded. And when these conflicts
"FED. R. BANKR. P. 2019(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
"FED. R. BAN.R. P. 2019(a)(2).
5 'See Richard H. Corbi, Billy Hildbold & Jonathan M. Petts, New Rule 2019: Distressed Investors,
What are you Holding?, 30-June AM. BANKR. INST. LJ. 14, at *76 (2011) (criticizing the amendment as
under inclusive because it does not apply to creditors who have investments that would profit from the
liquidation of the debtor).
asFED. R. BANKR. P. 2019(e)(2)(A) & (B).
6
FED. R. BANKR. P. 2019(e)(2)(C).
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come to light, courts should not hesitate to designate votes cast by the con-
flicted creditor.
B. THE LITIGATOR: MOTIVE TO ADVANCE LITIGATION STRATEGY
Debtors have also requested the designation of creditor votes believed to
have been cast for an ulterior motive related to ongoing litigation between
the debtor and the creditor, but without much success. These requests have
arisen in two very different kinds of contexts, described below. Regardless of
the context, a majority of courts have refused to disqualify votes on this basis.
The minority view, however, has recognized that in some cases creditors may
be casting their votes based, not on their status as creditors, but as part of a
litigation strategy. Using bankruptcy votes as a chess move in litigation not
only violates the purpose of bankruptcy voting, but it may also have a direct
effect on value maximization, when the litigation claim is itself one of the
estate's valuable assets. Thus, this is an area in which some courts need to
reexamine their reluctance to designate votes.
In In re Federal Support Co., the Fourth Circuit held that the mere fact of
litigation between the debtor and the creditor was not sufficient to support
an inference of a lack of good faith.87 Several of the debtor's employees
formed a competing business and took with them the debtor's only customer,
the U.S. Navy, leaving the debtor without means of generating revenue. In
its chapter 11 case, the debtor's only assets were litigation claims against the
competing business and one of the creditors. The estate had no funds to
pursue the litigation, but several of its officers offered to fund the litigation if
the plan was confirmed. The creditor who was a target of litigation voted to
reject the plan. The debtor argued that the creditor's vote should be desig-
nated because it had voted its claim based on its desire to avoid litigation
rather than to maximize its recovery on its claim. If the plan was not con-
firmed, and the case converted to a chapter 7 proceeding, the debtor claimed
that it was very unlikely the trustee would pursue the litigation because the
estate had no resources to do so. The Fourth Circuit rejected these concerns,
stating that if the litigation had merit, a trustee would find a way to pursue it
and that the defendant/creditor was merely voting its own self interests.
Other courts have adopted similar reasoning.88
Debtors have also raised litigation as a basis for vote designation in a very
different context. In In re Kovalchick, the debtor sought to disallow the votes
1
7Insinger Mach. Co. v. Fed. Support Co. (In re Fed. Support, Co.), 859 F.2d 17, 20 (4th Cir. 1988).
85E.g., In re Landau Boat Co., 8 B.R. 432, 436 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981) (holding, in a similar situation,
that there was "no evidence to suggest that the trustee would be less vigorous in pursuing it than would
debtor's counsel," and therefore no grounds to designate the defendant's claim.); In re Lloyd McKee Mo,
tors, Inc., 157 BR. 487, 489 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1993) (holding that litigation motive was "entirely specula-
tive," but, in any event, the creditor was entitled to pursue its own self-interests).
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of a creditor based on the creditor's litigiousness in the bankruptcy case.89
Here, the creditor wanted only to foreclose on its collateral and put up every
roadblock it possibly could to the debtor's reorganization efforts, including
excessive criticism of the disclosure statement, motions to dismiss, and incon-
sistent positions in various contested matters.90 The court refused to desig-
nate the claims, stating:
Courts have also held that the presence of any of the follow-
ing circumstances does not necessarily equate with bad faith:
(1) pending litigation between the claimant and the debtor;
(2) past attempts by claimant to have the debtor's bank-
ruptcy case dismissed; (3) refusal to cooperate with debtor's
reorganization efforts; and (4) excessive and expensive litiga-
tion with the debtor.91
The courts should recognize a fundamental distinction between the facts
of Kovalchick and Federal Support Co. In Kovalchick, the creditor was pursu-
ing its own agenda in order to maximize the recovery on its claim, however
self-interested and obnoxious its actions may have been. There are other
sanctions available to deter litigious behavior besides designating a creditor's
vote. In Federal Support, the creditor was likely casting its vote to avoid the
expense and risk of significant litigation. This is not significantly different
than a creditor voting to destroy a competing business or to benefit an adjoin-
ing property. It is a vote cast to achieve an economic interest unrelated to
the distributional outcome of the case. The court may have been naive to
think that the creditor in Federal Support did not achieve a tactical advantage
in blocking the plan. The insiders of the debtor who understood the claims
and were willing to fund the litigation were unlikely to do so with a bank-
ruptcy trustee in control of the claims. Thus, the court's refusal to designate
the creditor's vote likely had a direct impact on value maximization.
There are some courts that have recognized the need to police the use of
voting as a litigation defense. In In re Combustion Engineering, Inc., the
Third Circuit remanded the case for a consideration of, among other things,
whether the votes of certain asbestos claimants had been procured in good
faith.92 The debtor in this case entered into a prepetition settlement with
claimants who held existing, as opposed to future, asbestos claims. The
debtor transferred $400 million into a trust that provided for varying per-
centages of payment, based on the length of time that the claim had been
pending. For example, claimants who had already filed suit and settled, were
"In re Kovalchick, 175 B.R. 863, 875 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994).
90M.
91Id.
92In re Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 247 (3d Cir. 2004).
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to receive 95% of their claims and those claimants who had not yet filed suit
received a lesser percentage. The unpaid portion of each claim was treated as
a "stub claim," which the claimant would use to vote in favor of the plan, as it
was always anticipated that the debtor would file chapter 11. The settle-
ment trust for the existing claimants was established and funded eighty-seven
days before the bankruptcy filing. In its plan, the debtor offered to establish a
separate trust for the future claimants, but they were to receive payment of
only approximately 28% of their claims. The Third Circuit analyzed at
length the potential preference liability that the existing claimants faced. It
noted that, although the plan was later modified, at the time the existing
claimants cast their votes, the plan provided these claimants with a release of
liability against any future avoidance actions. On remand, the bankruptcy
court was to consider whether the existing claimants had voted their stub
claims based on an ulterior motive. Not only was the discriminatory treat-
ment an issue, but these claimants may have voted their claims to avoid pref-
erence liability. Thus, this court recognized that a desire to avoid litigation
claims may itself be an "ulterior motive."
Similarly, in Zentek GBV Fund IV v. Vesper, an insider of the debtor
faced potential fraudulent conveyance liability.93 He formed a family trust
and had the trust purchase claims against the debtor to block any plan that
would allow the chapter 11 trustee to sue him to recover fraudulent convey-
ances. The bankruptcy court designated the votes cast on behalf of his family
trust. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit upheld the designation. Even though the
proxy for voting had changed hands from the insider to others at the time of
voting, the court recognized that "[c]ourts have not limited their inquiries to
only the moment of voting but have also examined the motivation underlying
the purchasing of claims." 94
C. THE BETRAYER: VOTING IN ONE CLASS TO BENEFIT AN
INTEREST IN ANOTHER CLASS
As the case law demonstrates, the power to designate votes is intended
to ensure that a creditor is voting on the basis of its interest as a creditor, not
to benefit some other economic interest, such as an interest in a competing
business, an adjoining property, or separate contract. But does this mean that
the creditor who holds claims in more than one class, or who has claims
against multiple debtors, must cast its vote in each class based only on its
interests in that particular class? For example, may a secured creditor vote
its unsecured claims (whether it is a deficiency claim or claims it has pur-
93Zentek GBV Fund IV v. Vesper, 19 Fed. Appx. 238, 243 (6th Cir. 2001).
94Id. at 247.
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chased for this purpose) to reject the plan in order to further its interests as a
secured creditor who wants to foreclose? Is such a vote cast in good faith?
It is not uncommon in single asset real estate cases95 for the secured party
to purchase all or a controlling portion of unsecured claims in an effort to
block reorganization. 96  In re Figter Ltd. illustrates this dynamic well.97
There, the secured creditor, Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association
("Teachers"), objected to the debtor's plan that would convert its residential
apartment complex into condominiums and require Teachers to grant a par-
tial release of its lien with each sale of an individual unit. To block the plan,
Teachers purchased more than half of the unsecured claims at full face value.
This purchase gave Teachers the power to block the plan by eliminating the
one impaired class of dissenting creditors required for confirmation." Teach-
ers' purchase cost it a mere $14,588.62 and, for that amount, it was able to
protect its secured claim of almost $18 million.99 Of course it voted its un-
secured claims to further its secured creditor agenda, but the court viewed
§ 1126(e)'s requirement broadly. It found Teachers had been motivated by
its self interest in receiving "[its] fair share of the debtor's estate" 00 and
that Teachers "acted to protect its interests as Figter's major creditor."1ox It
did not distinguish between its interests as a member of a particular class as
opposed to its interests held as a creditor generally.
In re Adelphia Communications Corp. presents the classic case of con-
flicts that arise between the creditors holding claims, not only in separate
classes, but also against separate but related debtors.102 Adelphia is typical of
the large, multi-debtor bankruptcy cases that have captured the imagination
9 5Single asset real estate cases are those in which the debtor owns "real property constituting a single
property or project, other than residential real property with fewer than 4 residential units, which gener-
ates substantially all of the gross income of a debtor who is not a family farmer and on which no substan-
tial business is being conducted by a debtor other than the business of operating the real property and
activities incidental thereto." 11 U.S.C. § 101(5 1B) (2006). These cases are considered somewhat unique
in that there are few creditors involved other than a secured creditor and some believe that the general
goals of reorganization do not apply to such cases. See generally, Kenneth N. Klee, One Size Fits Some:
Single Asset Real Estate Bankruptcy Cases, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1285, 1296-1301 (2002) (providing
arguments for and against the application of general bankruptcy principles to single asset real estate cases).
96See Figter Ltd. v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. (In re Figter Ltd.), 118 F.3d 635, 637 (9th
Cir. 1997); 255 Park Plaza Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. Conn. General Life Ins. Co. (In re 255 Park Plaza Assocs.
Ltd. P'ship), 100 F.3d 1214, 1215 (6th Cir. 1996); In re Marin Town Ctr., 142 BR. 374, 377 (N.D. Cal.
1992); Principal Mut. Life Ins. v. Lakeside Assocs. (In re DeLuca), 194 B.R. 797, 804 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1996); In re Pleasant Hill Partners, L.P., 163 B.R. 388, 390 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1994).
' 7Figter Ltd. v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. (In re Figter Ltd.), 118 F.3d 635 (9th Cir.
1997).
98See supra note 19-20 and accompanying text for a discussion of this confirmation requirement.
991n re Figter Ltd., 118 F.3d at 637.
i"oId. at 639 (quoting In re Gilbert, 104 B.R. 206, 217 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989)).
oId. at 640.
o2In re Adelphia Commc'ns Corp., 359 B.R. 54 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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and attention of many bankruptcy commentators-and of distressed debt in-
vestors. 0 One of the significant issues in the case arose out of disputes
between related companies-disputes that the proposed plan of reorganization
settled.1o4 But the creditors of one debtor, referred to as ACC, believed that
the settlement favored the creditors of another subsidiary, Arahova. The
litigation that ensued was fierce.
Bondholders who held claims only against ACC sought to designate the
votes of bondholders who held claims against both ACC and Arahova (the
"Targeted Creditors"), claiming the Targeted Creditors had extracted special
benefits as a result of their "overly aggressive and overreaching" conductios
and their "scorched earth litigation strategy."106 The court acknowledged
the litigious actions of the Targeted Creditors, but was unwilling to desig-
nate their votes on this basis. The ACC bondholders then pointed out the
conflict of interest held by the Targeted Creditors. "[T]he Targeted Credi-
tor votes in favor of the Plan in the ACC Senior Notes Class were driven by
an ulterior motive-a desire to get a maximized recovery in another class, of
another Debtor, under the Plan (that of the class of Arahova notes)."10 7 The
court rejected this basis for designation as well. "Inter-company debts and
liabilities, which enhance recoveries of some creditors and dilute recoveries of
others, are inherent in any multi-debtor bankruptcy."o10 The court con-
cluded that "I do not believe that holding (or acquiring) claims of different
debtors in the same chapter 11 case fairly can be regarded as representing the
kind of ulterior motive or 'bad faith' that has heretofore been held to warrant
vote designation." o0
Both of these cases illustrate the need for courts (or Congress) to consider
whether voting need only be based on some creditor interest, or whether a
creditor must vote its interests in a particular class based on the economic
interest it holds in that class. At present, courts have not really grappled
with this issue. There is an underlying assumption that designation should be
reserved for especially egregious conduct. The court in Adelphia stated:
iO'See In re Adelphia Commc'ns Corp., 336 B.R. 610, 622-23 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (opinion on
appointment of a trustee and termination of exclusivity) ("[D]istressed debt traders and other investors in
claims have been a major presence in these cases, and since the filing of these cases in 2002, there was a
substantial turnover in the membership of the Creditors' Committee."), affd, 342 B.R. 122 (S.D.N.Y.
2006).
1o In re Adelphia Commc'ns Corp., 359 B.R. at 57. The inter-debtor dispute also formed the core of
an earlier dispute over the appointment of a trustee and the termination of the debtor's exclusive right to
propose a plan of reorganization. See In re Adelphia Commc'ns Corp., 336 B.R. at 617.
o'In re Adelphia Commc'ns Corp., 359 B.R. at 62.
moid. at 58 (citing In re Adelphia Commc'ns Corp., 336 B.R. at 618-19).
0
7oId. at 63.
oId. at 64.
aId.
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The ability to vote on a reorganization plan is one of the
most sacred entitlements that a creditor has in a chapter 11
case. And in my view, it should not be denied except for
highly egregious conduct-principally, seeking to advance
interests apart from recovery under the Plan, or seeking to
extract plan treatment that is not available for others in the
same class.1i 0
This sentiment is no doubt engendered by the Code's use of the phrase "in
good faith" and pre-Code case law's reference to "ulterior motives." These
phrases conjure notions of nefarious conduct. If, however, the underlying
purpose behind the designation power is to count only the votes of creditors
who are voting based on their assessment of the viability of the debtor's
business and whether the plan will achieve the best possible distribution on
their claim, thereby maximizing the value of the debtor's assets, then courts
must be willing to look beyond this narrow use of the designation power.
In fact, Congress considered adding language that would expressly elimi-
nate the kind of conflict of interest represented by voting in one class to
benefit an interest held in another class. "The original House Bill . . . ex-
pressly authorized the Court to designate the vote of an 'entity that has, with
respect to such class, a conflict of interest that is of such a nature as would
justify exclusion . . . ."I11 The Senate Bill did not contain this language nor
was it enacted in the Code."12
The Adelphia court viewed its omission as an indication that Congress
had considered, but dismissed, the requirement.
Congress could, if it wished, declare that when creditors
hold claims of multiple classes or debtors in multi-class or
multi-debtor chapter 11 cases, they must choose the particu-
lar class or debtor with which they will wish to be allied.
But it did not enact a provision that would have done ex-
actly that. I cannot now establish such requirements in the
absence of a legislative direction, especially retroactively,
when no court has previously so held, and creditors had no
advance notice that such rules would be applied to take
away their statutory right to vote."'
On the other hand, in dicta, the Dune Deck court reached the opposite con-
clusion, quoting from legislative history. "Congress deemed the provision un-
"Old. at 56-57.
"In re Dune Deck Owners Corp., 175 BR. 839, 845 n.13 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995) (citing H.R. Rep.
No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 411 (1977)) (emphasis added).
2Id. (citing S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978)).
"'In re Adelphia Commc'ns Corp., 359 BR. at 65.
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necessary because in its view, Section 105 'constitutes a sufficient power in
the court to designate exclusion of a creditor's claim on the basis of a conflict
of interest."
1 14
Given the disparate interpretations based on congressional silence on this
issue, should Congress now amend the statute to include this language? This
may be an area of the law that is better left to judicial interpretation. In the
single asset real estate cases, like Figter, it may not offend the value-maximiza-
tion goals of chapter 11 to allow a secured creditor to purchase a blocking
position in the unsecured class and to cast its vote in a way that fosters its
secured claim. Single asset real estate cases are often essentially two-party
disputes. The small amount of trade debt that arises in the month or two
before filing bankruptcy is often relatively insignificant. In Figter, all of the
unsecured creditors received an offer of full payment from Teachers. 15
Thus, Teachers' purchase did not unfairly discriminate, nor was the offer
coercive. The Ninth Circuit noted that the bankruptcy court found that
Teachers did not "seek to purchase a small number of claims for the purpose
of blocking Figter's plan, while injuring other creditors."i 6 Other cases have
drawn this distinction." 7 Moreover, given that this was a single asset real
estate case,' 18 there may have been little benefit to reorganizing. The value
of an enterprise holding only a single real estate asset usually does not depend
on whether the debtor is reorganized or liquidated. The value of the prop-
erty rarely depends on the identity of the property's owner.' 19 Thus, in cases
like Figter, the value-maximizing policies underlying chapter 11 are not likely
"41n re Dune Deck Owners Corp., 175 B.R. at 845 n.13 (citing 124 Cong. Rec. 817420 (daily ed. Oct.
6, 1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini)).
"5 Figter Ltd. v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. (In re Figter Ltd.), 118 F.3d 635, 637 (9th Cir.
1997).
"'Id. at 640.
117See 255 Park Plaza Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. Conn. General Life Ins. Co. (In re 255 Park Plaza Assocs.
Ltd. P'ship), 100 F.3d 1214, 1215 (6th Cir. 1996) ("Connecticut General certainly did not take advantage
of other creditors, since it offered to purchase for full value the claims of all non-insider unsecured credi-
tors."); Principal Mut. Life Ins. v. Lakeside Assocs. (In re DeLuca), 194 B.R. 797, 805 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1996) ("Principal Mutual paid 100 cents on the dollar for the claims it purchased, and it extended the
purchase offer to every unsecured creditor. The amount it paid is the same (100%) as the amount proposed
by the debtor's Fourth and Fifth amended plans."); In re Pleasant Hill Partners, L.P., 163 B.R. 388, 390
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1994) (noting FHLMC offered to purchase claims for the full amount claimed and pur-
chased all of the unsecured claims.).
"sSee 11 U.S.C. § 101(51B) (defining single asset real estate as "a single property or project . . . on
which no which no substantial business is being conducted").
1 '9See Christopher W. Frost, Single Asset Bankruptcy Cases: Drawing the Line Between Operating the
Property and Operating a Substantial Business, 28 No. 2 BANKR. L. LETTER I (Feb. 2008); Brian S. Kat,
Single Asset Real Estate Cases and the Good Faith Requirement: Why Reluctance to Ask Whether a Case
Belongs in Bankruptcy May Lead to the Incorrect Result, 9 BANKR. DEv. J. 77, 83-85 (1992). But see Klee,
One Size Fits Some, supra note 95, at 1297-1301 (discussing benefits of chapter 11 reorganization for the
real estate market).
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to be compromised by the secured creditor's strategic vote of its unsecured
claims.
In a context like the Adelphia case, with multiple debtors and potentially
conflicting interests between them, it is still difficult to fashion a hard and
fast rule. In some cases, a plan that benefits one debtor and its creditors more
significantly might still be in the best interests of another debtor because the
less favored estate may realize significant benefits from the strengthening of
the enterprise as a whole. For these reasons, it may be better to maintain a
flexible approach in deciding when to designate votes.
Rather than adopting stricter language in § 1126(e), the better course is
for courts to view their designation powers more broadly. Instead of policing
only egregious behavior when asked to designate votes, courts should con-
sider whether allowing the votes will in some way frustrate the underlying
purpose of voting. The extreme reluctance to deny creditors a vote should
give way to the bigger purpose to be served, namely value maximization.
Designating a vote is not the same as disallowing the claim; it does not rob
the creditor of its distribution under the plan. It does not even deny the
creditor the ability to object to confirmation. It merely reflects a judicial
decision that the vote cast does not reflect the creditor's assessment of the
debtor's viability and/or whether the plan represents its best chance for re-
covery on its claim. When a vote does not foster these aims, it is better to
consider only those votes that do.
D. THE PURCHASER: MOTIVE To ACQUIRE DEBTOR'S ASSETS
Contemporary chapter 11 cases are often better conceptualized as a com-
ponent of the mergers and acquisitions market, rather than a safe haven for
businesses in danger of dismemberment by an angry mob of creditors. Credi-
tors often push for early asset sales and insist on replacing managers. Auc-
tions and negotiated sales of the entire business provide a means of quickly
moving assets into the hands of new owners, leaving cash or other easily
valued assets to be distributed to the claimants according to their respective
priorities.
Sometimes non-creditors purchase creditor claims as part of a strategic
move to acquire the debtor or its assets. Recently, in the case of In re DBSD
North America, Inc., the Second Circuit affirmed the designation of a would-
be acquirer's vote.120 Although it was a competitor, the acquirer did not
reject the plan in order to run the debtor out of business, leaving creditors
unpaid. Instead it sought to propose a competing plan that would enable it
to acquire the debtor's assets. While the Second Circuit viewed this agenda
"0 DISH Network Corp. v. DBSD North Am., Inc. (In re DBSD North Am., Inc.), 634 F.3d 79, 101-05
(2d Cir. 2011).
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as an "ulterior motive," such motivation may actually foster the Bankruptcy
Code's overarching goal to maximize the value of a debtor's assets.
The debtor in DBSD owned a satellite and land-based mobile communi-
cations network. Its capital structure was comprised of first and second lien
debt, unsecured debt, and equity. The debtor's plan proposed to pay the first
lien debt with new bonds that had the same principal amount and interest
rate as the existing debt, but for the first four years, the holders would be
paid in kind-with additional debt, rather than cash. Holders of second lien
debt would receive substantially all of the equity in the reorganized debtor,
with a tiny portion of the equity going to holders of unsecured claims. The
prebankruptcy equity holders were to receive shares and warrants as well;
but they would receive those interests indirectly through a "gift" from the
second lien debt holders, who would otherwise have been entitled to receive
all of the equity interests. 121
DISH Network had not been a prebankruptcy creditor of DBSD. It had
a substantial investment in a company known as TerreStar, which also was a
development-stage telecommunications company that the bankruptcy court
found was a direct competitor of the debtor. After the bankruptcy, DISH
purchased 100% of the first lien debt at par and around 17% of the second
lien debt for about 30 cents on the dollar. Internal documents of DISH ex-
pressed an intent to "control the bankruptcy process" to enable it to purchase
either the debtor itself or some portion of the debtor's assets.
The purchase of the first lien debt gave DISH a blocking position over
that class of claims. The bankruptcy court disqualified the votes based largely
on the fact that DISH was taking its actions, not to maximize its return as a
creditor, but instead to advance its agenda as a potential purchaser.12 2 The
Second Circuit affirmed, characterizing its plan as an effort to "bend the bank-
ruptcy process toward its own strategic objective of acquiring DBSD's spec-
trum rights."123
Like many courts, the Second Circuit in DBSD stated that it did not
intend to create a categorical prohibition against purchasing claims for strate-
gic reasons, but in fact that was its implied ruling. There were no allegations
of bad conduct or other ulterior motives. This case did not involve the unfair
discrimination and coercion concerns raised in P-R Holding, where the selling
creditors received better treatment than the non-selling creditors.124 DISH
1
21 d. at 87. This gift prompted an absolute priority rule objection by Sprint, an unsecured creditor;
which objection ultimately derailed the debtor's plan.
122In re DBSD North Am., Inc., 421 B.R. 133, 141-42 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), affd, 2010 WL 1223109
(S.D.N.Y. March 24, 2010), affd in part, revd in part, 627 F.3d 496 (2d Cir. 2010), opinion issued, 634
F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2011).
123In re DBSD North Am., Inc., 634 F.3d at 104.
124See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
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was not a plan proponent that was attempting to purchase claims to avoid
the prohibition on vote solicitation that had been present in the Allegheny
case. 125
The Second Circuit did not engage in an extensive analysis of the facts of
these earlier cases. It simply pointed to the fact that DISH sought control,
was a competitor of DBSD, and was willing to overpay for the claims it
bought as evidence of its bad faith. The bankruptcy court's findings were
slightly more extensive. That court pointed to the fact that DISH "pur-
chased all of the First Lien Debt at par, knowing that the plan proposed
replacing the First Lien Debt with an Amended Facility that DISH did not
want."' 26 The only other thing the court could point to was that DISH had
filed a motion to terminate exclusivity so that it could propose a competing
plan. These actions, however, only serve to show that DISH bought the
debt in pursuit of its acquisition of the debtor's assets through a competing
plan.
The Second Circuit's opinion appears to have condemned DISH's actions
principally because they were motivated by its desire to acquire the debtor's
assets. In addition, the court condemned DISH's efforts to exert control over
the bankruptcy case. 127 The court observed:
DISH had every right to propose for consideration whatever
strategic transaction it wanted-a right it took advantage of
here-and DISH still retained this right even after it pur-
chased its claims. All that the bankruptcy court stopped
DISH from doing here was using the votes it had bought to
secure an advantage in pursuing that strategic transaction.128
Neither the bankruptcy court nor the Second Circuit was clear about what
that advantage might be. Based on the facts in the reported opinions, DISH's
efforts to even make a serious proposal to the creditors may well have relied
on stopping the debtor's plan of reorganization. Had DISH succeeded in
stopping the confirmation of the debtor's plan-a plan that was ultimately
denied confirmation because of a flawed inter-class give-upl29-DISH might
"'See supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
1261n re DBSD North Am., Inc., 421 B.R. at 140 (emphasis original).
1270ther courts have also listed "control" as one of the factors considered in a finding of bad faith
under § 1126(e). See, e.g., In re Dune Deck Owners Corp., 175 B.R. 839, 844-45 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995).
But these courts fail to explain how control by itself is harmful to the estate or its creditors. In fact,
battles over control in a bankruptcy case are commonplace. Control is the underlying issue in motions for
relief from the automatic stay, extensions or terminations of exclusivity, and the appointment of a trustee.
It is only when control is exercised to achieve an end that is inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code that
it problematic.
128In re DBSD North Am., Inc., 634 F.3d at 105.
m9See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
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have been starting from zero, not from a position of strategic advantage. Af-
ter all, the defeat of the debtor's plan would not have amounted to a complete
victory by DISH. Any plan or strategic transaction DISH proposed would
be subject to the same scrutiny as the debtor's plan.
The Second Circuit stated that DISH sought somehow "to use status as a
creditor to provide advantages over proposing a plan as an outsider, or mak-
ing a traditional bid for the company or its assets."130 The court went on to
state, "[i]n effect, DISH purchased the claims as votes it could use as levers
to bend the bankruptcy process toward its own strategic objective of acquir-
ing DBSD's spectrum rights, not toward protecting its claim."' To be sure,
if DISH hoped to have an opportunity to acquire the assets through the
bankruptcy, it would have to defeat confirmation of the debtor's plan of reor-
ganization, and that effort was facilitated by the acquisition of the first lien
claims. But the court was not clear what advantages that gave DISH or why
its use of the "levers" was wrongful.
Acquisitions are a legitimate and often welcome outcome in chapter 11
cases. In a more recent unpublished case, In re Trikeenan Tileworks, Inc., the
court considered that very question in the context of the debtor's objection
and allegation that a competing plan had not been filed in good faith, as re-
quired by § 1129(a)(3).13 2 In this case, a competing tile manufacturer had
purchased a small claim for the sole purpose of filing a competing plan. When
the debtor's plan was not confirmed, the debtor tried to stave off the compet-
ing plan, by claiming it was bad faith to purchase a claim solely for the pur-
pose of gaining standing to file a plan, and through the plan to destroy its
competitor. It asked the court to hold the plan proponent to the same stan-
dards that apply to the designation of votes by creditors who hold an "ulte-
rior motive."'33
The Trikeenan court held that it was not bad faith to acquire a claim for
the purpose of filing a competing plan, even one in which a competitor sought
to acquire the debtor or its assets.
Debtors have failed to explain how Butler's Plan is in contra-
vention of the policy goals of the Bankruptcy Code. Being a
competitor who proposes a competing plan to take over the
debtor does not equal bad faith per se. To the contrary, the
Supreme Court has noted that lifting exclusivity to propose
a competing plan opens the door for other parties to bid for
Iln re DBSD North Am., Inc., 634 F.3d at 104 (quoting In re DBSD North Am., Inc., 421 B.R. 133,
139-40 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009)).
311d.
132In re Trikeenan Tileworks, Inc., 2011 WL 2898955, at *7-8 (Bankr. D.N.H. July 14, 2011).
'33 d. at '8.
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the equity of the company. There is no requirement that a
competing plan must be friendly to the existing management
or ownership of a debtor. Nor is there any bar in the Bank-
ruptcy Code against a competitor proposing a takeover of
the debtor.13 4
Thus, the Trikeenan decision is at odds with the DBSD decisions in its view
of the beneficial purpose of allowing claims purchasers to participate in the
bankruptcy process to acquire the debtor or its assets.
Hindsight in the DBSD case also shows the benefits to be realized from
allowing parties to cast their votes based on an acquisition motive. To un-
derstand the subsequent history, a little more background is required. There
was a second appeal in DBSD filed by Sprint Nextel Corporation, the holder
of a disputed $211 million unsecured claim that dominated the unsecured
class. It had objected to the plan on the basis of the absolute priority rule.
Although the unsecured creditors were not paid in full, the plan allowed the
equity holders to receive a small amount of equity in the reorganized debtor.
The bankruptcy court found that the issuance of new equity to old equity
holders was not given by the debtor but was a "gift" made by the second
lienholders, to whom all of the equity was owed under the absolute priority
rule. It reasoned that a secured creditor could give away whatever it wished
to whomever it wished, without violating the absolute priority rule. The
Second Circuit did not agree and reversed on this basis.
In finding that all of the equity in the reorganized debtor would other-
wise belong to the second lienholders, the bankruptcy court relied on the
assumed value of DBSD of $692 million. The second lien holders were owed
$750 million. Since they could not be paid in full, the decision to transfer
some of the equity to old equity holders might be considered a transfer of
property belonging to the second lienholders. At a higher valuation, how-
ever, transfers of equity to the shareholders would be transfers that should
have gone to the dissenting class of unsecured creditors.'35
Following the Second Circuit's reversal of the confirmation order based
on Sprint's appeal, DISH made an initial bid for the debtor's assets of $1
billion. At auction, DISH was the successful bidder for a price of $1.4 bil-
lion-an amount sufficient to pay all of the creditors and to leave old equity
with a cash distribution of $325 million.' 36 Thus, with hindsight, it is clear
'"Id. at *7 (citation omitted) (citing Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Assoc. v. 203 N. LaSalle St.
P'ship, 526 U.S. 434, 457-58 (1999)).
'"See Ralph Brubaker, Taking Chapter Ii's Distribution Rules Seriously: "Inter-Class Gifting is Dead!
Long Live Inter-Class Gifting!" 31 No. 4 BANKR. L. LETTER 1 (April 2011).
"'David McLaughlin, Dish Network's Revised Offer for Bankrupt DBSD Wins Court's Approval,
BLOOMBERG.COM (March 15, 2011, 1:18 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-15/dish-net-
work-s-revised-offer-for-bankrupt-dbsd-wins-court-s-approval.html.
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that allowing competitors or others with an acquisition motive to participate
in the bankruptcy process may realize a far greater value for the debtor's
assets. For this reason, courts would do well to follow the lead of the
Trikeenan court in reconsidering the use of the designation power in this
area.
This is not to say, however, that anything goes in these acquisition cases.
Courts must remain vigilant to guard against creditor actions that are de-
signed to drive down the value of those assets by interfering with the confir-
mation process or obstructing creditor votes on other competing plans. At a
minimum, however, the decision to designate a potential acquirer's vote
against the debtor's plan should be justified by evidence of behavior that the
creditor is taking actions to forestall consideration of other plans or has en-
gaged in coercion in the acquisition of its claims. Further, designation of such
creditor's votes should normally be accompanied by a termination of debtor
exclusivity so that competing plans may be offered.
IV. CONCLUSION
With some exceptions, cases considering vote designation indicate a
strong fidelity to basic bankruptcy principles and relate directly to the kinds
of motivations and actions that interfere with the purpose of the chapter 11
voting process. Voting in bankruptcy is designed to further the goal of maxi-
mizing the value of the chapter 11 debtor's business assets. The creditors'
assent to a plan of reorganization is thought to be based on their view that
the plan maximizes their total recovery. Most of the voting power is in the
hands of creditors who occupy the residual position; thus, maximizing those
creditors' return should maximize asset value.
Claim designation cases generally focus on the types of behaviors and
motivations that interfere with the ability of bankruptcy voting to achieve
that value-maximizing goal. Thus, where a creditor is motivated by a desire
to destroy a competitor, that creditor's vote is directly at odds with the
value-maximizing goals of the bankruptcy process and courts should and do
disqualify such votes. The extortionate motives of the blackmailer and the
coercive efforts of some claim buyers similarly lead to distortions in the vote
that may interfere with value maximization. Actions that circumvent the
authority that the Code grants bankruptcy courts to control the plan confir-
mation process may also lead to designation.
Some courts have a harder time recognizing when a creditor's motivations
are at odds with the value-maximizing goals of the process. Side agreements
that create a motive to decrease, rather than maximize, the value of the assets
may be difficult to uncover. Even where the agreements come to light, courts
occasionally fail to recognize the fact that the creditor's vote may be at odds
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with a central goal of chapter 11. Resistance to a plan to gain an advantage
in litigation between the estate and the creditor normally should also result
in disqualification. Here again, courts only sometimes recognize the conflict.
Cases in which the creditor holds or purchases claims in multiple classes-
each with differing incentives and motivations-may create conflicts that are
best resolved on a case-by-case basis.
Finally, cases in which a creditor seeks to acquire the debtor or its assets
do not necessarily present a conflict that warrants disqualification. Asset
purchases in bankruptcy have become a common and accepted means of
resolving chapter 11 cases and may, in fact, achieve the highest value for the
debtor's assets. Thus, a goal of acquiring the debtor should not be a per se
basis for designating the claims. Only where this acquisition goal is accompa-
nied by actions that appear designed to coerce the sale of claims or to drive
down the value of the debtor should the court consider the use of the desig-
nation power.
